THE TRUTH
ABOUT CITIZENSHIP: An Outline*
by
W.B. Allen
James Madison College
Michigan State University
Citizenship belongs not to
nations but to human beings. Tribes,
peoples, and nations may have members, but only regimes founded in universal
principles can properly have citizens.
The original British constitution wisely denominated all other political
relationships as the relations between subjects and sovereigns—subjects,
precisely because the persons comprehended in the description owe a loyalty and
belong to their states in a condition of subjection (relations not based on
consent) rather than command. The paradox
of citizenship properly so called is that it cannot occur universally, is
rather realizable only in particular, exclusive instantiations, and nevertheless
addresses the end of every human being.
Many of the actors in
Eastern Europe in the last very few years have encountered this very paradox,
discovering that citizenship is not an intuitive phenomenon. Martin Palous[1] observed that the legal definition of citizenship is far from
sufficient because it does not address perhaps the most important aspect of
this problem: citizenship cannot be reduced either to a legal formula or to a
factual description of its implementation under given historical and political
circumstances. The reason, he
maintained, is that citizenship has its “subjective dimension” as well. It appears that, in some decisive fashion,
the good polity hinges very much on the question of how to bring about the good
politēs. Interestingly enough,
however, at the founding of the United States, the emphasis was reversed, most
notably by George Washington, who emphasized the question of the effect of the
citizen on the polity over the question of the polity’s effect upon the citizen. The reason for that, I believe, was his
conviction that the foundation of a good polity was the preference for justice
over patriotism for souls forced to choose.
Washington, I think, was correct; it is rather justice that vindicates
patriotism than patriotism which produces justice.
A reader may justifiably
seek some account of the departure from widely held, prior conceptions of
citizenship, especially that of ancient Athens (the politēs, the
citizen as participant in ruling and being ruled in turn), monarchical Britain
(essentially that of allegiance to a particular monarch legally defined in Calvin’s Case[2] and since defended in R. v. Joyce)[3], and, more loosely, certain
current views called “communitarian.”
Following upon modern
efforts to found political society in individual will, experience proved a
mutual nolo nocere commitment
insufficient. The formal acknowledgment
of a continuing right of revolution in the Declaration of Independence derives
from this recognition. The contract to
avoid force and fraud may be expedient in a limited sphere, but it is not
generative. It does not derive a table
of obligations with sufficient force to sustain a society and, more particularly,
to tie one generation to another.
Religion, of course, offers a formula which is strongly generative,
universal in its principles,[4] and also restrains force
and fraud. What religion fails to do,
however, is to ground public authority sufficiently to replace warfare as a
means of constitutional change. The
challenge of modern sovereignty, therefore, was to attain the expediency of the
nolo nocere commitment, the strength
of religious foundation, and, at the same time, to regularize constitutional
change as an expression of lawful procedure.
In seeking the substantial
meaning of citizenship, it is more important initially to identify the agency
by which—the efficient cause through which—citizenship comes to be than it is
to identify the end of citizenship. The
reason for this pre-Kantian scruple is that the question of citizenship derives
from considerations of the end of man—the individual, general rather than local
concerns—and at a minimum individual will must be positively accounted for or
overcome in any theory of citizenship agency which does not repose in the
agency of the individual. The will of
the community or the goals of the whole can have no pre-creation trumping
power. This is the decisive meaning of
the Phoenician tale, the noble lie in Plato’s Republic. Apart from a
comprehensive account of individual will, every polity of any sort must cover
with a lie or myth a large gap in its story of itself.
An example of this may be
located in pre-revolution American society, as colonialists in Massachusetts
early detached themselves from the idea of subjection central to English citizenship. The case of Robert Child is, precisely, a
lesson in the limitations of pre-modern sovereignty. The 1646 Remonstrance and Petition of Robert Child, and Others,[5] sought redress of injuries
they thought they suffered as Englishmen at the hands of the General Court of
Massachusetts. The dispute arose over
the notion that all the King’s subjects (the King-in-Parliament, that is) had
the right to exercise citizenship in the colony on grounds harmonious with the
exercise of rights in England. The
petitioners, however, found that they
cannot, according to our
judgments, discern a setled forme of government according to the lawes of
England, which may seem strange to our countrymen, yea to the whole world,
especially considering we are all English.
Neither do we understand and perceive our own laws or liberties, or any
body of laws here so established, as that thereby there may be a sure and
comfortable enjoyment of our lives, liberties, and estates, according to our
due and natural rights, as freeborne subjects of the English nation. . .
. . . Neither can we tell whether the Lord hath
blest many in these parts with such eminent political gifts, so as to contrive
better laws and customs than the wisest of our nation have with great
consideration composed, and by many hundred yeares of experience have found
most equal and just; which have procured to the nation much honour and renowne
among strangers, and long peace and tranquility amongst themselves.[6]
Quite early, then, the
Americans were suspected, if not suspect.
They were viewed as setting their judgment against the weight of
tradition, even at the risk of endangering the secure and comfortable enjoyment
of the natural rights to life, liberty, and estate. Well before the impact of Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, in a word,
the full impact of European (including Scottish) Enlightenment, and English
republicanism, the terms of constitutional debate were set in Massachusetts. However, there was one significant exception,
involving the question of ultimate sovereignty: Who shall have the last word?
The General Court, in its reply to Robert Child, acknowledged his
complaint about the civil incapacitation resulting from the practice of
inappropriate religions and also the Court’s refusal to support a bishop in the
“true church.”[7] They even pointed with pride to their indulgence of the founders
of Rhode Island, who were allowed to emigrate there and to undergo the “natural
corruption” to which such “liberty and equality” were known to be subject.[8]
In Boston, though, the
General Court held fast for breaking its barbarians by “the ordinary means of
instruction,” as a precondition for the civil and ecclesiastical “peace and
prosperity” to which all aspired. This
firm stand followed a lengthy review of the petitioners’ arguments about the
civil constitution, in which the General Court distinguished itself by
considering the constitutional question seriously. The review has two parts.
In the first, it arrays the petitioners’ arguments against
themselves. From this, the General
Court concludes that their “manifest contradictions” have overthrown their
case, in light of which “we might have throwne out theire petition, as not
worthie of our further trouble . . .”[9] Yet the General Court continued on to address the grievances
brought forth in the Remonstrace.
We will therefore, for the
petitioners’ more cleare conviction, and further satisfaction to all the world,
examine their particular grievances, and other passages which we meete with in
their remonstrance, &c. and give
such account of our government and administrations both civil and
ecclesiastical, as none shall be able (we hope) to contradict the truth
thereof.[10]
This unprecedented and magnanimous appeal to
reason—exceeding even the Declaration of Independence’s faith in a “candid
world”—then sets forth the Court’s claim to a “settled government.”
The General Court claimed
affinity with the fundamental laws of England (“taking the words of eternal
truth and righteousness along with them as that rule by which all kingdoms . .
. must render account”),[11] but exemption from
patterning their “positive lawes” after England’s due to differing
necessities. Next it proceeded to set
forth in parallel columns, article by article, the fundamental laws of England
(collected from Magna Charta and the Common Law) and the “Fundamentals of the
Massachusetts” (collected from the “Body of Liberties,” the Charter, and
custom). Throughout this production the
Court sustain its case that their
government closely resembled that of England.
Nevertheless, it clearly affirmed an independent authority.
The important exception
emerged at that point. The
Massachusetts General Court reached in 1646 what Locke was to declare in
1680: the affirmation of legislative supremacy. The first article under the “common law”
column reads: “[T]he supreme authorities
is [sic] in the high court of parliament.”[12] This anticipation of the Settlement of 1688 would not so necessarily
offend Robert Child (for whom the monarch remained head of the church) as the
parallel column under the “Fundamentals of Massachusetts:”[13] “The highest authorities here is [sic] in the General Court, both
by our charter, and by our own positive lawes.”[14] In reading this, we are torn two ways. We wish to know if already by 1646 some really did wish to
exclude parliamentary authority over internal matters in the colonies. However, finding an indigenous precursor to
Locke is significant simply because it shows that the one Lockeian difficulty
which the Americans had to overcome was the same considered by the General
Court, the supremacy of the representative legislature.
The story of the American
Revolution begins with the story of the derailing of the English Revolution,
which Montesquieu described as
A lovely enough spectacle in
the past century, to see the impotent efforts of the English to establish
democracy among themselves . . . since the spirit of one faction was repressed
only by the spirit of another, the government changed ceaselessly. The astonished people searched for democracy
but found it nowhere. Finally, after
many movements, shocks, and shake-ups, it even became necessary to settle on
the government which they had proscribed.[15]
The Restoration was rather
the result of the derailing than a derailing of itself. The true derailing takes expression in a
1649 Act of Parliament,[16] which declared Parliament
to be the “supreme authority of this nation.”[17] And no one, Roundheads,
Levellers, Diggers, or even the Lord Protector, could ever arrive at a
suitable formula whereby the people might supplant the Parliament without the
utter destruction of order and government.
All believed stable government depended on what Madison later called “a
will independent of the society,” the pre-modern form of sovereignty and also,
incidentally, the institutional foundation of tyranny. Even after the second Revolution in 1688,[18] this fundamental tenet
remained the sticking point of British republicanism, ultimately codified as
permanent principle by Blackstone on the very eve of the singular American
advance beyond this dilemma.[19]
There is a connection
between legislative supremacy and the General Court’s express determination to
man the barrier to vice, which is not apparent in Locke’s version. The form of government depends upon the
placing of supreme power, which is the legislative. The people appoint the form of government by establishing the
legislature and appointing its members.
Society holds the supreme power, not in any form of government, but only
in the absence or dissolution of government, and in society under government
all powers must derive from and be subordinate to the legislature.[20] Locke’s argument in Locke is the basis for Blackstone’s assertion
that the British Parliament has permanent and necessary custody of the British
constitution.[21] In substance that is the same argument the General Court relied
upon to persuade Robert Child that it must exercise caution in admitting
persons to citizenship in the colony and, most importantly, to membership in
the church.
Locke’s argument seems to
concern itself only with the form of government. In fact, Locke claims that the only joint action the people are
capable of is to constitute the society, and society’s preservation requires a
superintending will independent of it.
While he admits the right of revolution (as an unavoidable deduction),
he excludes the possibility that every man can be left to liberty of conscience
in his civil obligations. Thus, Locke
leaves work for the public to assign and order men’s civil obligations whether
aimed at virtue or no. His reasoning
seems to correspond with the General Court’s rejection of such liberty. Where the Court found natural corruption and
dissension, Locke found the state of war.
To launch modern
sovereignty, Americans had to contend at once with a legacy of pride in
superior institutions and the unresolved problem of how to entrust to human beings,
who were thought to need public formation toward virtue, a conceded right to be
governed not just in founding a society but at all times by their own
consent. Obviously, virtue’s claims to
public authority had somehow to be relaxed at the same time as the aim of
virtue—self-government—had to be reinforced.
It will immediately appear that virtue’s claim to rule does not automatically
transfer into a title on the part of those civil authorities approved by the
church or other interpreters of virtue (hence, the need for the Phoenician
tale). Indeed, one may see that dependence
on consent is partially generated by genuine skepticism as to the rightful
priests of virtue. The highway to
government by consent—modern sovereignty—passes by way of the recognition that
virtue, to rule at all, must be left to fend for itself (rather than armed with
state power). Every other arrangement
enslaves or subordinates virtue to some one superstition or another.[22]
The foregoing example,
coupled with philosophical analysis of its relevance, clarifies modern
sovereignty in the sense of removing concern with consent—or individual
agency—as mainly a question of efficiency.
The first question is how to generate a good polity. Success in doing so only can lend scope to
the important but secondary question: What sustains a good polity? If the question of citizenship belongs
rather to the first or primary question, rather than to the secondary question,
it will follow that reasonings premised on a putative incompatibility between
individual agency and community stability do not in fact respond to the
requirements of the argument. Before
one can require responsibility of citizens, one must invent citizens.
James Madison successfully
navigated an analogous difficulty.[23] He recognized that liberty would breed poisons potentially fatal
to popular government. However, he also
recognized that liberty was a sine qua
non of the good polity. The
argument required a demonstration of methods to mitigate the harmful effects of
liberty rather than argument designed to challenge the authority of
liberty. The position of modern
sovereignty is analagous to the position of liberty according to Madison.[24] The universal principle on which it stands is palpable to every
human being and is perfected in the design of the United States. It will perhaps serve the purpose of this
expose, therefore, if we respond to the question: Why is it that the idea of
United States citizenship, without regard to community or national origins, is
intuitive to human beings around the world?
The answer, I believe, is
that American citizenship is defined strictly in terms of those human
characteristics and circumstances that manifestly apply to all human
beings. Because those terms, as
suggested in the Declaration of Independence, invoke human interests and ambitions
as the basis of membership in a good polity, it follows that wherever persons
hope for the fulfillments to which their individual interests and ambitions
inspire, they will naturally regard themselves as capable of American
citizenship. This premise is the novus ordo seclorum, a world in which
men can imagine “marrying themselves abroad” without conceiving that to do so
entails abandoning their dearest attachments.
When Aristotle identified intermarriage as the fundamental condition for
unity in the polis, he pointed beyond the immediate relationships among
individuals to the realms of human imagination. In that realm what counts is the good that one can imagine for
oneself. Whatever offers that prospect
becomes automatically the standard of decency and fulfillment.
By holding out such a
promise the United States and every similarly constituted republic makes a
commitment beyond the limits of its own territory. That commitment is to recognize and reward to the extent
practicable the aspirations of human beings who find in this promise cause for virtuous exertion. It is that condition of modernity which
chiefly distinguishes it from the ancient world. One recalls Juba patterning himself upon the noble Cato.[25] It might be thought that Juba wished to be a Roman; in fact, he
wished only to be supremely human. What
is new is the ability persons now have to draw such inspiration from the idea
of citizenship in a free republic. It
is a paradox of considerable complexity that what is held out to every human
being willy-nilly can still hold forth the prospect of excellence. There are many thoughtful critics who deny
such a possibility a priori. They do so , in my view, in ignorance of the
precise character of modern citizenship, which hinges on affirmation of the
people’s capacity for rule despite long-standing doubts on that score.
A system of rule which makes
no further distinctions among men than their raw numbers—which is modern
democracy—could not fail to expose a people to the influence of folly in their
affairs. As Henry Neville said, this
was taught by “great artists ancient and modern.”[26] The traditions of British-American republicanism[27] remained influenced by that
teaching from Neville up to the very eve of the American founding. A sea-change in opinion brought Americans to
doubt that there was any acceptable alternative to risking dangers of folly in
the Commonwealth. The problem was how
to build a decent republican life out of ordinary humanity. The labyrinthine trail of pre-Revolutionary
opinions is easily traceable to England, Europe, and antiquity precisely
because the American problem was the age quintessential political problem. Solutions discussed, far reaching as they
were, were always the old solutions.
The most characteristic of them, the mixed regime solution, from
Plato-Aristotle to Isaac Pennington and beyond, was a firm belief in the
necessity for a constitutionally imposed and balancing hierarchy of souls in
the Commonwealth. The solution
accomplished two purposes. First, it
restrained the violence of conflicts between the elite and the masses; second,
it prostrated folly to the influence of substance and experienced
judgment. It did so, however, only at
the cost of keeping the constitution at arms length distance from the people,
subjecting them to superior titles to rule—the solution of pre-modern
sovereignty.
So long as any mixed regime
persisted, representatives of the varying estates (or classes or nations)
actually represented not the body politic, but their respective warring
“cities,” between or among whom an uneasy truce was enforced in the guise of a
civil constitution. The many have
always seemed not merely unfit but unable to rule. To say that the many are unable to rule is to emphasize the rule
of folly wherever they prevail.
Moreover, it suggests that they
fail to attain either the good or the objective at which they aim, due to their
incapacity. All justifications for
their subjection to superior authorities, therefore, derive from the claim that
the masses are better served by the institution of unrestrained sovereign
powers. However, the degree to which rulers are free of the
influence and authority of folly is equivalent to the extent to which they may
abuse their powers. The recognition of
this problem produces the interest in finding ways to constrain the rulers to
the pursuit of the common good.
This scenario formed the
context in which the doctrine of Non
tallagio non concedendo (as well as that of religious toleration) came to
express a deep and abiding distrust not just of rulers but of regimes
(especially the nation-state) themselves.
The very end of politics began to seem impossible to attain. The escape from this paradox (occasioned by
long and detailed reflections on political order) produced the move by the
American founders which affirmed that it were not sufficient for the people to
be thought to rule; they actually had to prevail, through the majority, in
governing. Moreover, no authority able
to act on its own, apart from dependence on the people, could be expected to
adopt liberty as the objective of its government. Therefore, there could be no “will independent of the
society.” Such stringent concerns as
these led to the radical formulation
that no just polity could be formed except on the broadest foundations of human
participation and on terms which foreclosed the political primacy of
traditional terms of human identification.
This conclusion meant following Aristotle’s dictum regarding intermarriage
with a vengeance. Mere humanity, raw
individuality would constitute the
basis for all claims to citizenship.
The broadest claim to
citizenship in the ancient city was that of “good birth.” At a minimum, therefore, one had to be born
into citizenship and in that sense it was not distinguished from that of the
most isolated tribe even today. True,
at best, the ancient city offered something more valuable than tribal
society. It made membership in the political
community a gateway to the human good.
Nevertheless, its organization and its moral claim rested decidedly on
grounds of nativity.
It must be remembered that
there was no formal concept of citizenship in the ancient polis. This ancient citizenship, the politēs,
would be better translated “participant in the polis.” Not all could participate; in the best case
only the well-born could. Still, the politēs
as a model of participation was a great advance over mere tribal society. Thus, Aristotle’s archeology moved naturally
and surely from family to village to polis without a hint of denigration of
family or loss of civic culture. The
constraint of birth in this progress was inconsistent with modern sovereignty,
which needed a broader foundation for membership in the polity, one beyond the
participant, indeed, the citizen.
Rome first recognized this
necessity, still working on the model of pre-modern sovereignty and having
originated in the like grounds of birth that animated other ancient
cities. However imperial Rome made the
city an abstraction, abandoned finite limits as a determinant of the regime’s
reach, and aimed for universality not by taking men in, so to speak, but by
nationalizing whole tribes and extending
Roman citizenship promiscuously.
This was the error for which Montesquieu believed Rome fell. To Rome, everyone was a Romans or not a
Romans. Roman law could make anyone
from any place a Roman, no matter where that person lived. By force of circumstance, the Roman citizen
ceased to be a participant in any but a nominal sense. Nevertheless, one did not thereby become
human, invested with a more-than-Roman dignity and thus was little more than a
savage dressed in a toga. The hordes
never really invaded Rome until after it had debased the lineage on which it
depended. It was not truly a universal
regime. For when it abandoned its particular foundation, Rome also ceased to be
any particular polity.
Rome’s experience created
the conditions out of which the nation-state emerged. Europe’s feudalism, which precipitated the nation-state, was,
according to the Federalist Papers,
“a solecism in theory” predicated on “legislation for communities, as contra distinguished
from individuals.”[28] The “violence in place of law” and the “destructive coercion of
the sword” were ultimately stilled only by theories of subjection in the
nation-state, and then only for a time.[29] Notions of enforced peace and territoriality in the nation-state
ran full tilt against individual interests and the human propensity toward
displacement. There never was a perfect
match of nation-state borders and nationalities, nor could there have been.[30] Therefore, the absolute monarchy, the original perfected form of
the nation-state, proved inadequate to the conceptions of human ends which
pressured that state toward its eventual dissolution. Far in the future of absolute
monarchies, and also ahead of the modified nation-states which supplanted them,
lay the palpable demand for an end to subjection. Consent alone could accommodate the moral claims of human beings.
Modern sovereignty replaces
the nation-state with the state-nation.
This is not a mere play on words but rather the introduction of a
substantive distinction. Under the
terms of modern sovereignty membership in the state is defined by positional
rather than by status. Nationality no
longer operates to secure the relevant distinctions, which consist primarily in
determinations concerning the extent to which rights are guaranteed. The first distinction under modern
sovereignty is the distinction of citizenship—membership in the state based on
commitments of rights guarantees which are available to human beings qua human
beings but obligated only by the effective agency of state membership.[31] The existence of the state
serves to create de facto that class of human beings whose nominal rights are
actually enforceable in contrast with those whose rights are exposed to
abuse. In those terms, there are never
any citizens under totalitarianism—which remained a form of ancien régime sovereignty—although
nationalities survived more or less intact under totalitarianism.[32]
Modern sovereignty requires
the death of nationality or community membership, not as vital memory but as
primary and active basis of civic association.
Consequently, the idea of the civic culture, which belongs to the
nation, plays no role in sustaining the state-nation even though the
state-nation still relies on mediating institutions to preserve that social order
which stability and progress require.
Mediating institutions, however, only grow out of particular soils. That, in turn, gives rise to the appearance
that a “civic culture” remains fundamental, although it in fact becomes only
instrumental.
The fact that modern
sovereignty relies on a principle of exclusivity—and citizenship is such a
principle—no less than does the idea of the nation accounts for twentieth
century confusion concerning the grounds of membership in the modern
polity. The concept of
self-determination seems to grow out of principles of modern right, while appearing
to apply only to an idea of peoplehood which owes nothing to such
principles. Thus, state organizers
of the Twentieth Century have attempted
to find a natural basis of statehood in the phenomenon of the community rather
than in the non-aggregated preferences of rights-bearers.
We may re-think the problem
of exclusivity under modern sovereignty so as to reveal its merely functional
and not moral power. Modern sovereignty
rests on universal principles rather than local or particular claims. A Czech Republic becomes a Czech Republic
not by virtue of being Czech but by virtue of consciously adopting republican
goals. Thus far it is no more Czech
than Slovak or American. Founding its
statehood on universal principles rather than local claims means that the local
claims no longer determine membership.
Hence, the republic’s Czechness
is an accident, morally speaking, rather than a necessity. This accident occurs for the sufficient reason—the
Aristotelian reason—that every essence appears (becomes phenomenal) via
agencies whose accidental qualities condition being-in-the-world. Thus, universal principles are made manifest
only in particular forms.
Moreover, universal
political principles are articulable only in particular circumstances. To found a republic on principles of
universal right, one must organize a particular people who will subscribe those
rights. Now, one has two grounds of
particularity—hence exclusivity—which follow as a natural consequence. One accidental and not determinative, the
other essential. The accidental
particularity is the character or culture of the people so organized—thus Anglo-Americans
in 1776. The essential particularity is
the resulting collectivity itself, which becomes “a people” organized to live
on universal principles, and is thus distinguished from all other peoples
(including those similarly organized) and exclusive of peoples not admitting universal
principle as a ground of right.
Finally, the exclusivity
itself results in two consequences: one accidental and one essential. The universal regime is particular as to
other peoples while nonetheless admitting the potential membership of all other
persons (including persons presently members of illiberal regimes). On the other hand, while all persons qua persons are eligible members of the
universal regime, in fact the requirements to sustain the regime and provide
for its preservation impose practical limits on the number of persons
admissible to membership.[33]
The United States, as late
as the early Twentieth Century, offered no formal political asylum. The explanation was simple; no one needed a
reason to apply for American citizenship or residence once inside the United
States. Immigration was essentially
open and unprescribed, which implied that anyone at all could be an
American. In such a world citizenship
serves no further than to distinguish actual and potential membership in the
liberal regime or, morally, good fortune and bad fortune.
It must have been such a
reflection as this that led Alexander Bickel to the erroneous conclusion that
citizenship doesn’t really matter:
[E]mphasis on citizenship as
the tie that binds the individual to government and as the source of his rights
leads to metaphysical thinking about politics and law, and more particularly to
symmetrical thinking, to a search for reciprocity and symmetry and clarity of
uncompromised rights and obligations, rationally ranged one next and against
the other. Such thinking bodes ill for
the endurance of free, flexible, responsive and stable institutions. . .[34]
It has been the failure to become a little
“metaphysical” and “symmetrical,” however, which has led scholars and jurists
like Bickel and others to create the untenable nether world of American
Indians. They both are and are not
citizens in the United States and, consequently, suffer immensely from being
denied the most elementary protections, while nuanced legal theorists try to
carve out a form of citizenship which is at the same time a form of wardship to
govern policy toward them. Indeed,
despite the universal implications of citizenship on the terms of modern sovereignty,
citizenship still matters.
The truth about citizenship
is not only that it elevates statehood to displace nationhood, but that it also
is the decisive condition for articulating the idea of a common good under
modern sovereignty. The idea of modern
sovereignty emerges from the discovery of natural rights and the resulting requirement
of consent to establish legitimate government—a state as opposed to a
nation. Nevertheless, it is not so much
natural rights as the practical goal of self-government deduced therefrom which
creates the moral conditions of citizenship.
The state-nation is defined more by constitutional goals, in contrast to
the nation-state in which terms of nationhood or social histories prevail. The chief constitutional goal is that of
self-government—a moral reality which is prior to and must shape the political
reality as the fundamental condition of political legitimacy.
Thus, even when one is
skeptical of the philosophical principles of natural rights, one still must
confront the reality of modern sovereignty in the form of self-government as
the irreducible human claim. Thus it
was last century that the Aristotelian, Gillies, could reject John Locke’s
social contract but still advance the claims of modern sovereignty. Building on the concept of a “system of
civil society” which he attributed to Aristotle, Gillies argued that under many
circumstances the good of the community may be promoted by giving to the people
at large a role in control in the government.[35] His argument joins that of the Federalist Papers, maintaining that self-government is not one among
the many ends of the modern polity.
Rather, it is the end which comprehends all the particular ends that are
described in the good polity. This is
doubtless what Madison meant when he wrote, “Justice is the end of
government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be pursued,
until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.”[36]
* This essay was originally prepared for the Colloquium, “The Truth About Politics,”sponsored by the Prague Circle of Political Philosophy, July 4-7, 1994, Prague, Czech Republic and subsequently revised for the Symposium, “The Good Polity Today” sponsored by the University of Pennsylvania, November 4-5, 1994, Philadelphia. This last revision has benefited from the contributions of colleagues in both conferences. It is published in the Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 4:2 (Summer 1996): 355-372
[1] Martin Palous is a professor at Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic. His observations are taken from remarks given at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
[2] Calvin’s Case, 7 Co. Rep. 1a, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.B 1608) (also known as The Case of the Postnati, or of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England, 6 Jan. I A.D. 1608), reprinted in 2 A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors from the Earliest Period to the Year 1783, at 559 (T. B. Howell, ed., 1816).
[3] Regina v. Joyce, [1945] 2 All E. R. 673, aff’d sub nom. Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1946 App. Cas 347 (appeal taken from Eng.).
[4] The universality of religious principles is open to discussion. However, with respect to the world’s major religions, the characterization is true.
[5] “Remonstrance and Petition of Robert Childs, and Others” (1646) in A Collections of Original Papers Relative to the History of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay 188 (1769).
[6] Id. at 190-191.
[7] “A Declaration of the General Court holden at Boston 4 (9) 1646, concerning a Remonstrance and Petitions exhibited at last Session of this Court by Doctor Child, Thomas Fowle, Samuel Mavericak, Thomas Burtin, John Smith, David Yale, and John Dand” (April 9, 1646) in A Collection of Originial Papers Relative to the History of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay, at 196 (1769).
[8] Id. at n8.
[9] Id. at 199.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 202.
[13] Id. at 201.02.
[14] Id. at 201-02.
[15] Translated from Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, III, 3 (Masson ed., 1954).
[16] An Act Declaring England to be a Commonwealth. May 18, 1649.
[17] Id.
[18] This was the second English revolution. The first, the English Civil War, took place from 1648 to 1660.
[19] Stanley N. Katz, Introduction to 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England at iii (phot. reprint 1979) (1765). While it is true that Blackstone specifically affirmed parliamentary supremacy, it may also be said that the purpose of the Commentaries is to unfold English law in such a manner as to defeat claims of popular reversion of sovereignty.
[20] Locke repeatedly affirmed that “the form of government depending upon the placing of the supreme power, which is the legislative . . .” John Locke, “An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government” in Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume, and Rousseau XX, 77. This may, however, seem only a delegation of limited powers, in light of the proviso that men cannot convey to others the power of “their preservation” and “always have a right to preserve what they have not a power to part with.” Id. at 87, 88. Locke explains, however, that the residual power of individuals cannot assume any governmental form—that is, it cannot be comprehended within the constitution. While, therefore, the power of the community may seem supreme, it is only figuratively so, since the only power the community as such can exercise is to form a constitution. They are not even able, under the constitution, to redress the deprivation of their rights.
Though the people cannot judge so as to have by the constitution of that society any superior power to determine and give effective sentence in the case, yet they have by law antecedent and paramount to all positive laws of men, reserved that ultimate determination to themselves which belongs to all mankind, where there lies no appeal on earth—viz., to judge whether they have just cause to make their appeal to heaven. Id.
This is the light in which one must read the assertion that the “legislative must needs be supreme, and all other powers in any member or parts of the society, derived from and subordinate to it.” Id. at 88. According to Locke, the legislative has permanent custody of the constitution, and that is the precise meaning of legislative supremacy (rendering the members of the community rather subjects than citizens).
[21] Blackstone, supra note 20, at 157; see id. at 149-57; cf. James Wilson & Thomas McKean, Commentaries on the Constituting of the United States of America 38, 62 (1792).
Sir William Blackstone will tell you, that in Britain, the [supreme] power is lodged in the British Parliament, that the Parliament may alter the form of government; and that its power is absolute control. The idea of a constitution limiting and superintending the operations of legislative authority, seems not to have been accurately understood in Britain.
[22] See, “Circular to the States” (June 8, 1783) in 26 George Washington, The Writings of George Washington 483 (John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., 1938).
[23] The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison).
[24] See id.
[25] See Addison, Cato.
[26] Henry Neville, “Plato Redivivus, or a Dialogue Concerning Government” (1681), reprinted in Two English Republican Tracts, 61, 83 (Caroline Robbins, ed., 1969).
[27] This term is far preferable, as more inclusive than the term Whig, in the attempt to identify the Anglo-American tradition. At a minimum it emphasizes that the Americans were “born republicans” (or at least “christened” so by Pastor Robinson) from the beginning, justifying Tocqueville’s perception.
[28] The Federalist No. 20, at 185-86 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed., 1974).
[29] Id. at 186.
[30] See Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (1993). Tamir recognizes this fact, even as she tries to save the idea of the nation-community as the fundamental basis of civil society.
[O]ur understanding of the need for generalised, impartial principles can only emerge through a commitment to partiality...if the former cannot be attained without experiencing and practicing the latter, then justice cannot become a permanent feature of our moral lives unless we recognise the importance of the morality of community. Id.
Modern states have, therefore, chosen to adopt national self-determination as their justifying principle, even when their members do not constitute a nation. . . [I]t strengthens the claim that members of the state share someting more than coordinating institutions, something that evokes in them feelings of solidarity and fraternity.” Id. at 124. While, on the other hand,
[t]he [liberal] state was therefore seen as an embodiment of abstract humanity, representing those universal qualities that unite all human beings. All dividing features were to be removed from the public sphere. Family affiliations, religious alliances, and professional ties were all viewed as private matters inconsequential to political life: The true nature of political agents was their citizenship, equally shared by all. Id. at 141.
Although this account cannot be squared with the blunt analysis of James Madison in Federalist No. 10, it is true that this over-generalized picture of liberalism describes the nature of the problem, and thus the task Tamir attempts, which is to argue that principles of justice spring from communities rather than nature. Tamir’s account is the best contemporary effort to accomplish this task, though it remains unfulfilled.
[31] James Wilson provides it thus:
Under civil government, one is entitled not only to those rights which are natural; he is entitled to others which are acquired. He is entitled to the honest administration of the government in general: he is entitled, in particular, to the impartial administration of justice. Those rights may be infringed; the infringements of them are crimes. The Works of James Wilson 426 (James DeWitt Andrews, ed., 1896).
This account of membership in civil government—citizenship—transcends questions of identity and culture to make rights paramount. Wilson, of course, was a member of the Constitutional Convention of the United States in 1787 and also on the first Supreme Court under the Constitution.
[32] In the aftermath of the Soviet Union, the argument I made fifteen years ago echoes faithfully. The preservation of Soviet power, including the tyranny over their own peoples, depends utterly on their exercise of that will. And that is the same thing as to say that they must frustrate and counteract all other ruling forces, including the political, which would diminish the force of their will (ergo, the Polish problem). Their empire is so constituted that they must either spread their power or die (abstracting from the limit which nature places to their power). Unlike the Romans, who destroyed themselves by [actually] developing a concept of Roman citizenship. I am saying that Soviet hegemonism, its spread, is the key to preservation of dubiety about Soviet citizenship and, hence, internal questions about a public good which might serve to coalesce opposition to the regime on the basis of a conception of the needs and ideals of a particular people. In other words, the Soviet regime lasted as long as it did only by means of waging war against the principle idea of modern sovereignty, citizenship.
[33] For example, such limits may include restricting the number of persons who can be admitted so as to be consistent with the sound functioning of a regime confronted with resource and relational limitations on its existence.
[34] Alexander M. Bickel, “Citizenship in the American Constitution,” 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 369, 387 (1973).
[35] John Gillies, Introduction to Edward Walford, Politics and Economies of Aristotle xxxviii.
[36] The Federalist No. 51, at 358 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed., 1974).