W. B. Allen, Chairman
and
Clarence M. Pendleton, Jr,
late Chairman
U. S. Commission on Civil
Rights*
Jesse Jackson has not been
treated fairly by the Democratic Party. That, at least, was the burden of his
complaints about the deleglate selection process. Jackson, it seems, thinks
that the slim nine percentage point differential between himself and Michael
Dukakis ought to have been reflected in the delegate count as well. Instead,
Dukakis held fifty percent more delegate strength than Jackson going in, and
the disparity predictably grew larger as the “super delegates” completed their
declarations, overwhelmingly in favor of Dukakis.
Is there any truth in this
claim? It is certainly accurate that Jackson has been something of a toy for
the Democratic Party the past five years, in spite of mounting a campaign which
has more resonantly invoked standard Democratic shibboleths than any other
candidate. While there may never have materialized the much heralded “stop
Jackson movement,” it may fairly be argued that Jackson’s visibility in the
campaign has not met with the kind of response one would have expected from a
party deeply in need of energizing regeneration. That alone would suggest some
element of reality for the persistent fears that the leadership of the
Democratic Party is inhospitable to Jackson, avowedly or not. It further raises
the question of whether Jackson’s race is regarded by Democratic leaders as an
albatross, a factor they would well wish to exploit but never to be governed
by.
If these charges are
correct, it will be necessary for Jackson to prove them with reference to
something other than the numbers from the primary process. Besides the fact
that Jackson, himself, contributed much to the present Party rules for the
selection of delegates, his argument seems to miss the point. The focus on the
distance between himself and Michael Dukakis was a subtle sleight of hand, by
which Jackson in fact disenfranchised the remaining 35% of the Democrats who
participated in the primaries and caucuses and who voted neither for Jackson
nor Dukakis. The “super delegates” were no less obliged to show respect for the
views of supporters of the defeated candidates than for the candidates
remaining in the race. The sundry Gore, Simon, Gephardt, et. al. delegates also
had a choice to make. The question was, who was their second choice, and wasn’t
it disproportionately Michael Dukakis rather than Jesse Jackson? Because that
was so, then it follows that Jackson had nothing to complain about. He received
exactly what the voters intended.
How did this scenario
finally become so visible? Jackson was in the rare position of having the vast
majority of votes for his candidacy identifiable by voters. Since blacks
accounted for the overwhelming share of that vote, his proportion of the total
vote of the primary process was only slightly greater than the proportion of
blacks within the Democratic Party. It turns out, then, that the problem
Jackson complained about is largely the ironic result of his having isolated
the votes of blacks within the Democratic Party.
This phenomenon has been too
little noted by commentators. It represents a historic change in the operation
of American electoral politics. Heretofore the votes of blacks have been isolated,
but only as between Democrats and Republicans. In that context, one could
always imagine that, within the Democratic Party, the votes of blacks were as
diverse (represented equally diverse opinions) as those of most other
Democrats. Now, for the first time, it is apparent that black Democrats do not
vote so-called Democratic views so much as they vote race, at least in this
election cycle. Because of that they stand out, are isolated within the
Democratic Party—a significant minority but nonetheless a minority. In earlier
times it was said that Republicans could ignore American blacks because they
never count on receiving their votes. In this election that shibboleth has
proved true for the non-black candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination.
What this change means is
that, in some manner, the votes of blacks are up for grabs. Those are
non-ideological votes and therefore cannot be considered as entirely reliable
in terms of party identification. This is far more important than the platitudes
which filled the press about Jackson “proving” that a black person can mount a
serious campaign, or, again, the national eye wink which takes his strident
strummings as eloquent and articulate political speech. Instead, Jackson has
succeeded where even Jim Crow failed, isolating blacks not merely within
American politics at large but within the Democratic Party in particular. So
long as the Democratic Party remained heterogeneous, and the votes of blacks
within the party could be viewed as reflecting the party generally, blacks were
seen as politically coherent but not politically isolated. This was all the
more true because they were found in the majority party, and could
therefore be identified with a national consensus—the mainstream of American
opinion. Jackson has put an end to that forever.
This result could offer
enormous promise for the future, were it sensitively understood by political
schemers. Or, it could produce the kind of result which occurred in 1860, when
Democrat slaveholders refused to vote for Stephen A. Douglas, split the Democratic
Party, and assured the election of Abraham Lincoln.
* On Friday, June 3, Chairman Pendleton completed his revision of the draft of this essay, which had been sent to him by Chairman Allen earlier. It was ready to go to press. On Sunday, June 5, Chairman Pendleton died of a sudden heart attack. In the aftermath, we neglected to complete this discussion of race and politics in America. Nevertheless, it remains a significant discussion, as well as the last piece on which the former Chairman labored. Accordingly, it has been revised to make it current.